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To analyze this evolution and the extent to which bureaucratic politics now influences the appointment process, this paper will examine the appointment process from two perspectives: the original intent of Both the choice of language and the grammar itself suggest the intended relationships between the President and the legislative branch.
While nothing qualifies the nomination authority given to the President, i.e., the power to choose the nominee, the President's appointment power is limited to certain specified positions and is shared with the Senate through the "advice and consent" requirement. 4 The language also makes it clear that Congress can legislatively vest appointment authority in someone other than the President. 5
Central to this issue is the fact that the "power to hire, and especially to fire, is the essence of control of federal administration. ''6 To the extent that Congress through the enactment of laws, or the Senate through the advice and consent process, can affect who is "hired" during the appointment process, the legislative branch can exert 3. As Gouverneur Morris put it, "As the President was to nominate, there would be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there would be security."
See James E. Gauch, "The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme Court Appointments," University of Chicago Law Review 337 (1989): 350-51.
This law review article contains an exceptionally thorough analysis of the Appointments Clause with considerable detail and quotation from original records of the Constitutional Convention.
4. Gauch 339.
5.
In fact, Congress has empowered federal judges to appoint supervisors of elections, and that action has been upheld. Ex parte Siebold, i00 U.S. 371, 379-84, 397-98 (1879).
6.
A. Michael Froomkin goes on to point out that Congress has imposed a variety of different requirements, e.g., age, sex, race, citizenship, educational experience, language proficiency, or residency on the pool of eligible nominees from which the President may choose.
Although Congress may not initiate the process by selecting the particular nominee, it may severely narrow the potential applicant pool.
8.
Froomkin 807.
9.
Gauch 341-44.
i0. The Committee of Eleven was composed of one delegate from each state and met to resolve disagreements over specific language in the newly drafted Constitution.
ii. The Federalist No. 77 (Hamilton) (1788).
12.
Alexander Hamilton, writing as Publius in The Federalist No. 7__66 in 1788, clearly articulated the accepted viewpoints when he wrote:
[One] man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment.
The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation ....
A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body .... ... [E]very advantage to be expected from such an arrangement would, in substance, be derived from the power of nomination, which is proposed to be conferred upon him; while several disadvantages which might attend the absolute power of appointment in the hands of that officer would be avoided [by the Senate's participation]. In the act of nomination, his judgment alone would be exercised;
and as it would be his sole duty to point out the man who ... should fill an office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to make the final appointment.
There can, in this view, be no difference between nominating and appointing ....
The same motives which would influence a proper discharge of his duty in one case, would exist in the other.
And as no man could be appointed but on his previous nomination, every man who might be appointed would be, in fact, his [the President's] choice.
.oo
To what purpose then require the cooperation of the Senate?
...IT]he necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity.
13.
Proper "advice" involving comprehensive review might prevent the nomination of an unqualified candidate or insure that the Senate favors a specific nomination.
Presfdent Reagan actively solicited the views of key senators before nominating AnthG~ Kennedy to the Supreme Court in an effort to achieve a swifter anu smoother confirmation process.
See Gergen 39 and Gauch 340. It has also been suggested that more emphasis should be placed on "advice" than on "consent." Robert F. Nagel, "No Show Show," The New Republic 7 Oct. 1991: 20-21. 14.
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